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CONSTITUTIONAL PARENTAGE
Joanna L. Grossman*
INTRODUCTION
Who is a legal parent? Advances in reproductive technology,
the emergence of widespread lesbian and gay co-parenting, and
the dramatic rise in non-marital childbearing have made it more
difficult to determine which adults are legally tied to which
children. Yet, sharper differentiation in constitutional terms
between parents and non-parents has made the question of legal
parentage even more important. It may seem obvious that the
oldest of recognized privacy rights—the right of parents to the
care, custody, and control of their children—would factor heavily
in the determinations of something as important as parent-child
relationships. But in the last few decades, during which parentage
law has evolved at a breakneck pace, the role of constitutional
parental rights has not always stayed front and center. This
Article will bring those rights back to the foreground—showing
the many ways in which constitutional parental rights haunt or
help the development of parentage doctrine, which is as complex
as the array of families it governs.
As Justice O’Connor wrote in Troxel v. Granville, the
“demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to
speak of an average American family.”1 It is likewise difficult to
speak of a typical parentage rule or a typical role for constitutional
parental rights. Although sometimes invisible, constitutional
protection for parental rights lurks in every determination of
parentage. In some situations, those rights are the reason why a
state must recognize a particular person or a category of people
as legal parents. In others, those rights are the reason a person
cannot be recognized as a parent. And in still others, it is an
invisible force that quietly dictates the way parentage law has
* Ellen K. Solender Endowed Chair in Women and the Law and Professor of Law,
SMU Dedman School of Law.
1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
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taken shape or the procedures it employs to determine which
adults have the rights and obligations that come with legal parent
status.
One might observe that over the course of the last century,
constitutional protection for parental rights has grown more
robust. But one might also observe that the law of parentage—the
set of rules and doctrines that determine who is a legal parent—
has expanded to at least potentially recognize a broader array of
individuals as legal parents, including individuals such as unwed
fathers, lesbian co-parents, intended parents, and sometimes even
sperm donors. Yet little attention has been paid to the natural
points of conflict between these two developments. When
parental status is granted to one adult, the rights of any other legal
parent are diluted. That’s not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, the
other parent may have been the one to insist on recognition of the
second parent. Or the legal parent’s sense of exclusivity may not
have been warranted in the first instance. But parentage doctrine
must square its rules with the constitutional protections to which
any adult may legitimately lay claim. Courts, legislatures,
advocates, and commentators need to be more explicit—and
more careful—about how to account for those constitutional
parental rights when determining parentage.
In this Article, I will first chronicle the development of
constitutional parental rights from the beginning to the end of the
twentieth century. This part will explore the scope and origin of
those rights, as well as the central role they played in the
development of the broader right to privacy. Second, the Article
will consider the initial clash between parental rights and
parentage law, which took place in the 1970s and 1980s fight over
the rights of illegitimate children and unwed fathers. In that era,
the Supreme Court made clear that state parentage laws were
constrained by federal constitutional protection for parental
rights, a tension that had never before reached the courts. The
final section explores four modern contexts in which
constitutional parental rights and parentage law are most likely to
cross paths—non-marital childbirth, sperm donation, surrogacy,
and lesbian co-parenting. In each context, I consider the ways in
which constitutional parental rights have—or should have—
affected the rules to determine which adults have rights and
responsibilities with respect to which children. The influence of
constitutional parental rights on parentage determinations is
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discernible, but not always explicit, predictable, or a matter of
consensus across different jurisdictions. By analyzing the concrete
ways in which constitutional challenges have shaped parentage
law, I hope to contribute to the development of such a system that
does boast those characteristics.
I. THE PROVENANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PARENTAL RIGHTS
It is a fundamental tenet of family law that parents are
imbued with constitutionally protected rights, an idea cemented
by a series of cases in the early twentieth century. This began with
Meyer v. Nebraska, in 1923, in which the Court invalidated a
Nebraska law banning instruction at home or in school in any
foreign language before ninth grade.2 The state did have a right to
try to “foster a homogeneous people with American ideals,” but
it was not strong enough to override the parents’ right to have
their children learn German.3 The Due Process Clause protects
individual liberty, which “denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual . . . to marry,
establish a home and bring up children . . . and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”4 Nebraska’s restriction
on foreign-language instruction materially interfered “with the
power of parents to control the education of their own.”5 Without
any evidence that the mere learning of a foreign language was
harmful to children, or that the government had some particular
expertise about this matter, the state had exceeded its power. Our
system is not, the court noted, the one suggested by Plato, under
which “no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his
parent.”6 But this approach, though “deliberately approved by
men of great genius” was based on “ideas touching the relation
between individual and state [that] were wholly different from
those upon which our institutions rest.”7 While the ancient Greeks
trusted only the state to raise and inculcate ideal citizens,
American states trust parents, who operate within a sphere of
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923).
Id. at 402.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 401–02 (quoting Plato’s Commonwealth).
Id. at 402.
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personal and family life that is protected from unnecessary
governmental intrusion. Only when the child faces imminent risk
of harm can the state intervene, which it does primarily through
the child abuse and neglect system. Parents were “within the
liberty of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment” when deciding
whether to instruct their children in a foreign language.8
This balance of power between parents and the state is a
delicate one, but the Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirmed that
the weight tips heaviest in favor of the parents. The Court’s ruling
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters followed just two years later.9 Here,
the Court invalidated an Oregon law that required children
between ages eight and sixteen to attend public school.10 States
could require that children attend school. They could also
regulate the schools and even the curriculum. But they could not
insist that children be educated only in government-run schools.11
A child was “not the mere creature of the state,” whose education
could be standardized without regard for the desires of “those
who nurture him and direct his destiny.”12 Parents, the Court
wrote, “have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare [children] for additional obligations.”13 That meant
that the compulsory public education law in Oregon
“unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control.”14
In the final piece of the trilogy, in 1944, the Court ruled in
Prince v. Massachusetts that a child’s guardian—her aunt—could
be convicted for allowing her niece to sell religious pamphlets on
the street in violation of state labor law.15 Here, it was the child’s
rights that were invoked, and they were not sufficiently strong to
override the state’s interest in restricting child labor.16 The Court
reaffirmed the super-parent role of the state, charged with
protecting “the welfare of children,” but also made clear that
power has to be balanced against “the parent’s claim to authority
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 400.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 534–36.
Id.
Id. at 535.
Id.
Id. at 534–35.
321 U.S. 158, 163 (1944).
Id.
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in her own household and in the rearing of her children.”17 Citing
Meyer and Pierce, the Court now pronounced it “cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”18 In this
particular case, the Court found the state’s interest to outweigh
the guardian’s; “child employment” is among those “evils” most
likely to justify state intervention.19
Those early cases stood not only for robust parental rights,
but also as the foundation upon which a broad right of privacy
would develop. As the Court wrote in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, a case in which it recognized the right to live with
extended family, “A host of cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer
v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, have consistently
acknowledged a ‘private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter.’”20 The Court returned to the scope of
constitutionally protected parental rights in 2000, in Troxel v.
Granville.21 There, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote
with a broad brush when it sharply limited the rights of nonparents to seek visitation with children over the objection of a fit
parent.22
In Troxel, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a Washington state statute that permitted
“any person” to petition for visitation with a child and permitted
courts to grant such petitions as long as it was in the best interests
of the child.23 The trial court had granted substantial visitation to
the paternal grandparents of two girls over the objection of their
mother. The girls’ parents, Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel,
had never married, but had cohabited and raised the children
together during the early part of the children’s lives. The couple
broke up in 1991, and Brad committed suicide in 1993. But for the
two years in between, Brad lived with his parents and usually
brought the girls to their house for his visitation weekends. After
17. Id. at 165.
18. Id. at 166.
19. Id. at 168.
20. 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (citing cases about the right to marry, the right to avoid
involuntary sterilization, the right to contraception and abortion, and the right to raise
children).
21. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
22. Id. at 61–63.
23. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.240, 26.10.160(3) (1994).
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Brad’s death, the Troxels sought to maintain substantial visitation
with their granddaughters—a schedule that was more akin to that
of a non-custodial parent than a grandparent. Tommie consented
to some visitation, but Brad’s parents sued for more, which the
trial court gave them.24 At the Supreme Court, a plurality of the
Justices agreed with Tommie that Washington state’s third-party
visitation law was unconstitutional as applied to her. The Troxel
plurality began by noting that the “liberty interest at issue in this
case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of
their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court.”25 In the Meyer/Pierce/Prince
trilogy, the Court had affirmed “that there is a constitutional
dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children.”26 The right to raise one’s children is “essential”27 and
“far more precious than any property right.”28 And in later cases,
the Court had recognized specific instances in which parents
might exercise those parental rights—and the limits placed on
those rights.29 These rights are not absolute, and the state can
temporarily or permanently override these rights when parents
are proven unfit by clear and convincing evidence.30 A fit parent,
however, must be presumed to be acting “in the best interests of
their children.”31 The “natural bonds of affection”32 lead parents
to act in just that way—leaving “no reason for the State to inject
itself into the private realm of the family to further question the
ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the
rearing of that parent’s children.”33

24. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71.
25. Id. at 65.
26. Id.
27. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
28. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982).
29. See, e.g., id. at 745 (right of procedural due process before involuntary
termination of parental rights); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (right of a child not to
be admitted to mental institution by parents without review by independent authority);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right of Amish parents to cease formal education
for their children after the eighth grade); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645 (right of unwed fathers
not to be categorically disregarded as parents).
30. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
31. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68; cf. In re Ta. L., 149 A.3d 1060, 1084 (D.C. 2016) (parents
whose rights are still intact are entitled to have their preference for adoptive parents to be
given great weight).
32. Troxel, 530 U.S at 68 (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 602).
33. Id. at 68–69.
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Encompassed within the right of “care, custody, and control”
is the right to exclude. Just as parents have the right to decide
where and how to educate their children, they have a right to
decide in ordinary circumstances whether their children will have
contact with other adults.34 But even fit parents do not have
absolute power over their children or the relationships they are
allowed to have with third parties. The balance between the rights
of the parent who objects to continuing contact and those of the
child and/or the third party is delicate, but, according to the Court
in Troxel, must be clearly weighted in favor of the parent. As the
plurality wrote in Troxel, the “problem here is not that the
Washington Superior Court intervened, but that when it did so, it
gave no special weight at all to Granville’s determination of her
daughters’ best interests.”35 In the words of the plurality, a court
must give “special weight” to a parent’s every decision, including
one to deny visitation to a child’s grandparents, and the burden
must lie with the non-parent rather than the parent.36 The
Washington statute, by relying solely on the “best interests of the
child,” without evidence of unfitness or even special
circumstances, left too much room for courts to trammel the rights
of fit parents. As applied to Tommie Granville’s decision to
restrict visitation with her daughters’ paternal grandparents, the
trial court constitutionally overstepped.
Third parties, especially grandparents, can still sometimes
win the right to visitation with someone else’s child, but the
circumstances in which such a right will be acknowledged have
narrowed.37 What drives these cases, and the statutes that underlie
them, is the clear delineation between parent and non-parent. The
third party seeking visitation typically does not claim to be a
parent; thus, the constitutional hierarchy is clear. But what about
someone who does claim to be a parent? The law’s conception of
any individual’s parental status must account for the biological
34. Id. at 72 (awarding visitation to the children’s paternal grandparents “was an
unconstitutional infringement on Granville’s fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of her two daughters”).
35. Id. at 69.
36. Id. (finding fault with the trial court’s presumption that visitation was appropriate
and forcing the mother to prove otherwise).
37. After Troxel, courts in many states faced challenges to their own third-party
visitation laws. Some survived; some fell. Compare Harrold v. Collier, 836 N.E.2d 1165
(Ohio 2005) (upholding third-party visitation statute), and In re Harris, 96 P.3d 141 (Cal.
2004) (same), and Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 2002) (same) with Santi v. Santi,
633 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2001) (invalidating third-party visitation statute).
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mother’s parental rights. It does this, explicitly or implicitly, in
different ways depending on the context.
II. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN PARENTAL RIGHTS
AND PARENTAL STATUS
There can be no question after this clear and unambiguous
line of cases that fit parents have constitutionally protected
parental rights. But which adults qualify as parents who possess
Meyer/Pierce/Troxel-type rights? That question has driven
decades of litigation over parentage—who is a legal parent—in a
wide variety of contexts. This section will explore the period in
history when the Supreme Court first confronted the potential
conflict between parental rights and parental status—and
produced an array of opinions that set the parameters for many
of the cases that have since followed.
The most powerful rights-holder is the biological mother.
Outside of an enforceable surrogacy arrangement, the act of
giving birth almost always gives rise to legal motherhood.38 Unlike
those of biological fathers, her rights cannot be undercut by her
failure to act as a parent once the child is born (unmarried
biological fathers) or by disproving the alleged genetic tie to the
child (husbands without a biological tie to wives’ offspring). A
woman who gives birth is a mother unless and until her rights are
surrendered or involuntarily terminated due to abuse or neglect.
Her rights are broad and, indisputably, include the right to “care,
control, and custody” of her child. This includes, as a general
matter, the right to decide with whom her child might develop
relationships.
Every child is given birth to by a mother. But when are that
mother’s rights exclusive and when are they shared? Before
Troxel, but many decades after the establishment of constitutional
protection for parental rights, the Supreme Court grappled with
the first conflict between parental rights and parentage law. For
most of American history, unwed fathers were not considered the
legal parents of their offspring. Identifying fathers as a source of
support, through civil and criminal bastardy laws, came many
38. See, e.g, D.C. CODE § 16-909 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.97(A) (West
2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.735 (2017); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2002) (“The mother-child relationship is established between a woman and a
child by . . . the woman’s having given birth to the child” unless otherwise provided in a
rule permitting enforceable surrogacy agreements).
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decades before any push to identify them because they might have
rights.39 States typically bifurcated paternal status, leaving some
men with obligations but not rights, and others with both. This
system was the subject of several challenges in the 1970s,
beginning with Stanley v. Illinois, in which the Supreme Court
considered whether Illinois had run afoul of the Due Process
Clause by categorically excluding unwed fathers from the
definition of “parent.”40
Although parental rights were entrenched in constitutional
privacy jurisprudence long before most other rights, the Court
had never once been asked, until Stanley, whether they applied to
unwed fathers. The question may not have arisen because the
illegitimacy rate remained very low until the 1970s, estimated at
only 1.8% in 1915; and only 3% in 1940.41 And many of those
births were concealed from the father as well as the public, thus
reducing the practical opportunities for men to assert claims to
their out-of-wedlock children. A discernible trend towards nonmarital childbearing took hold in the 1970s, and the percentage of
all children born to unmarried mothers reached 22% by 1985,
32% by 1994, and plateaued around 40% in the 2010s, coming
down from a peak of 43% in 2007.42
There is no one explanation for this meteoric rise in nonmarital childbearing, but the second half of the twentieth century
bore witness to the systematic dismantling of a system that had
tried to confine all legitimate sex to marriage—and to ignore or
criminalize the consequences when it took place in any other
context. The developing right of privacy gave individuals control
over contraception and abortion, and the Supreme Court
explicitly extended such rights to unmarried couples.43 Non-

39. 4 CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 5 (1936).
40. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
41. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS:
THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 96 (1994); Stephanie J.
Ventura, Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, 1940–99, 48 NAT’L VITAL STAT.
REP., no. 16, 2000.
42. See Ventura, supra note 41, at 17, tbl. 1; Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births:
Preliminary Data for 2015, 65 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 3, 2016, at 3–4, 10, tbl. 4.
43. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to terminate pregnancy before a
certain point); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of access to contraception for
single adults); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of access to
contraception for married couples).
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marital cohabitation began to rise,44 and, eventually, states caught
up to their residents by decriminalizing cohabitation and
establishing the possibility of property-sharing rights between
cohabitants.45 The stigma on unwed mothers precipitously
declined.46 Legislators and courts continued to favor and promote
sex and reproduction within marriage, but the practice of ignoring
all other family forms began to subside.
Illegitimate children struck the first blow to the traditional
system. States reflexively drew stark and often harsh distinctions
between children born to married and unmarried parents. Within
a few years, the Supreme Court would strike down a number of
these laws and establish that classifications on the basis of
illegitimacy were entitled to heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.47 Despite the fact that states had gone to some
lengths to penalize mothers for non-marital childbearing, neither
legislatures nor courts seemed to question the existence of the
legal mother-child relationship. The question was whether the
state could allocate benefits differently on the basis of
illegitimacy, not whether the woman was any less a mother
because of the child’s status. After the Supreme Court was done
dismantling the traditional system, it was clear that mothers had
the same legal relationship to their non-marital children as to their
marital children. This queued up a quite natural question: why
was this not true for fathers, too?
The Supreme Court tackled the questions surrounding the
treatment of unwed fathers, beginning in 1972 with Stanley v.
Illinois.48 Peter Stanley had lived intermittently with Joan Stanley
and their three children. But when she died, the children were
declared wards of the state, since, under Illinois law, they had no

44. See Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, National Estimates of Cohabitation, 26
DEMOGRAPHY 615, 621 (1989).
45. On these developments, see JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA
124–141 (2011).
46. See generally ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF WOMEN WHO SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES
BEFORE ROE V. WADE (2006) (chronicling the strong social and family pressure for unwed
women to give up children before adoption).
47. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Glona v.
Am. Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968).
48. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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surviving legal parent.49 He argued that the Illinois law that
treated him as a stranger rather than a father violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The Court was asked, in effect, whether
constitutional parental rights include the right to be recognized as
a parent in the first instance.
The Court dealt first with the suggestion that states could
simply refuse recognition to unwed fathers because of a
preference for the traditional family. Such a suggestion was
undermined by the Court’s recent decisions in the illegitimacy
cases, however.50 As the Court observed, the state does not have
unfettered discretion to draw the “‘legal’ lines [of parenthood] as
it chooses.”51 The scope of those limits has driven, if sometimes
only implicitly, the development of parentage law over almost half
a century.
With respect to unwed fathers, the Court concluded that
Illinois had drawn with too broad and harsh a brush. The
categorical rule of non-recognition actually undermined the
state’s identified interests.52 Illinois aimed to protect “the moral,
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best
interests of the community” and to “strengthen the minor’s family
ties whenever possible.”53 Yet, the law allowed children to be cut
off from custodial, biological fathers (Stanley, e.g.) based solely
on marital status. “[T]he State registers no gain towards its
declared goals,” the Court wrote, “when it separates children
from the custody of fit parents.” “Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father,
the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly
separates him from his family.”54 The Court was not optimistic
that many unwed fathers would make the grade—it may be that
“most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents”—
but at least a select few are “wholly suited to have custody of their

49. Id. at 646.
50. Id. at 652 (internal citations omitted) (noting prior cases holding that “children
cannot be denied the right of other children because familial bonds in such cases were
often as warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a more formally organized
family unit”).
51. Id. (citing Glona, 391 U.S. at 73).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 652–53.
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children.”55 Peter Stanley, in the Court’s view, was entitled to an
opportunity to make his case as a father deserving of custody.56
The parentage questions that have occupied courts in recent
decades stem from the tension the Supreme Court first identified
in Stanley between parentage laws that are typically left to state
legislatures, on the one hand, and federal constitutional
protection for parental rights, on the other.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PARENTAGE IN THE NONTRADITIONAL FAMILY
Parentage law has been challenged by each move away from
the traditional family composed of married heterosexual spouses
who conceive and raise children with biological ties to both of
them. With each move—from marital to non-marital, from
biological to functional parenting, and from heterosexual to
homosexual adult relationships—courts have had to grapple with
the indicia of parentage. Biology, marriage, intent, function, and
contract have all emerged as possible bases on which to recognize
legal parentage, but, in any given case, those factors can be in
tension or even completely at odds with one another. This section
will consider the development of parentage law in different
contexts as it relates to constitutional protection for parental
rights.
A. UNWED FATHERS
Stanley started the conversation about the constitutional
parental rights of unwed fathers, but it took several additional
cases to work out their contours. The Supreme Court revisited the
parental rights of unwed fathers several times, asking which
unwed fathers had the right to be treated like parents, with the
constitutional right of “care, custody, and control” that came with
the status. The Court continued to insist that unwed fatherhood
not be categorically ignored, but began to hammer out the degree
to which states could still differentiate between the parental rights
of unwed mothers and those of unwed fathers. In Quilloin v.
Walcott, the Court upheld a provision of the Georgia code that
denied an unwed father the right to veto a proposed adoption.57
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 654.
Id.
434 U.S. 246, 255–56 (1978).
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Georgia provided a mechanism for legitimation, but the father
had not used it. Without legitimation, the Supreme Court wrote,
“the mother is the only recognized parent and is given exclusive
authority to exercise all parental prerogatives, including the
power to veto adoption of the child.”58 Adoption by the child’s
stepfather was approved over the objection of the child’s
biological father. This stark differentiation between unwed
mothers and unwed fathers seemed to violate the principles
elucidated in Stanley just six years earlier, but the Court saw more
substantial “countervailing interests” in this case.59 In Stanley, the
choice was between the children’s remaining with their custodial,
biological father or becoming wards of the state.60 His interest was
“cognizable and substantial,” while the state’s interest in caring
for children with a fit parent was “de minimis.”61 But here, the
Court found the countervailing interest in cementing an existing,
stable family unit, consisting of mother, child, and stepfather, was
more substantial.
In two later cases, the Supreme Court would further outline
unwed fathers’ rights, sticking to the robust version suggested in
Stanley. In Caban v. Mohammed, the Court invalidated a
provision of New York law that gave unmarried mothers the
exclusive right to consent to, or veto, the adoption of a child.62
Abdiel Caban had fathered two children while living with their
mother; he refused to consent when the mother married someone
else and sought a stepparent adoption.63 The Court rejected New
York’s defense that “a natural mother” usually has a “closer
relationship with her child . . . than a father does” and insisted that
unwed mothers and fathers be treated equally.64 Moreover, Caban
had a much stronger claim as a social father than did the man in
Quilloin. The Court left open the question whether unwed fathers
would have the same equal claim to infants, with whom they had
not yet developed a social or emotional relationship. Just four
years later, though, the Court said no.
In Lehr v. Robertson, the Court held that unwed fathers—
unlike unwed mothers—were not entitled automatically to full
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 249.
Id. at 247–48.
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658–59.
Id. at 651–52, 657–58.
441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979).
Id. at 382.
Id. at 388–89.
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parental rights.65 Women became full parents by giving birth, but
men had to assert paternity and take advantage of the opportunity
to develop an attachment with their biological children.66 This
case involved an eight-month-old infant, born out of wedlock,
who was adopted by her stepfather. Her biological father,
Jonathan Lehr, objected that he did not receive notice or the
chance to object. Like many other states, New York maintained a
“putative father registry,” which gives unwed fathers the chance
to notify the state of their intention to assert paternity over a
child—or a potential child.67 Jonathan had neither registered, nor
satisfied any other criteria to receive notice of his child’s
adoption.68 He argued that a putative father’s “actual or potential
relationship” with his child was a “liberty” protected by the
Constitution, and that the differential treatment of unwed
mothers and fathers was an equal protection violation.69 The
Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that Jonathan’s biological tie to
Jessica was not enough to justify full constitutional protection of
his parental rights.70 The Court distinguished between a
“developed parent-child relationship,” and a potential one. The
biological tie offers the natural father a unique opportunity to
“develop a relationship” with the child, and if he “grasps that
opportunity,” and accepts some “responsibility for the child’s
future,” he may “enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship.”71 But if not, the Constitution will not “automatically
compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child’s best
interests lie.”72
The unwed father cases both reinforced and fueled a shift in
the conception of the non-marital family. Marriage and parentage
became less entangled, and courts and legislatures began to
rethink the parameters of parent-child relationships. The
recognition of constitutional parental rights for fathers forced
states to abandon their old systems, which gave little or no
protection to unwed fathers, and replace them with statutory
schemes that balanced fathers’ rights with the desire to facilitate
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
Id. at 250–52.
See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 2017).
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251–52.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.

GROSSMAN_DRAFT 6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

CONSTITUTIONAL PARENTAGE

7/13/17 12:44 PM

321

adoption where the mother sought it. The result was statutes that
treat men as legal fathers only if they meet one of several
criteria.73 This represented a shift away from marital status as a
proxy for biological fatherhood and towards recognition of
emerging as well as full-fledged father-child relationships, paving
the way for many of the analogies urged and drawn in more
complex family situations.
In this long-running conflict over the treatment of unwed
fathers, states struggled to maintain a system that did not impede
adoption placements but was also sufficiently protective of the
constitutional parental rights of unwed fathers. The genetic tie
gives rise to a constitutional right to parent, which, in turn, sets
the parameters for state parentage law. States cannot define
parentage in a way that excludes men who grasped the
opportunity to parent and earned constitutional parental rights.
As we will see, some other conflicts between parental rights and
parental status are harder to resolve because state parentage law
often seeks to expand the parental status of a person without a
constitutional claim to parental rights. That doesn’t prevent the
state from acting, as a matter of policy, but it raises the possibility
of intruding on the rights of an existing parent.
B. SPERM DONORS
In what ways do constitutional parental rights intersect with
the law of sperm donors? In this context, states have been
relatively aggressive about codifying parentage rules, in the hopes
of creating certainty and predictability in a setting that, by
definition, requires advance planning. But in their haste, many
legislatures failed to account for the potential constitutional rights
of men who might inadvertently have parental rights severed
despite intending to retain them—or for the rights of mothers,
whose desire to exclude the donor as a parent may be material to
her willingness to conceive with donor sperm and reflect a life
choice that deserves respect. These rights have arisen in litigation
from both sides, forcing courts to grapple with the tension the
legislatures ignored.
States still vary significantly in their treatment of parentage
in the context of sperm donation. Three-quarters of the states
have a statute that applies a rule of non-paternity in at least some
73.

See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 22–23 (2017).
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situations. They vary in scope, although none apply to
conceptions achieved through sexual intercourse. These statutes
are all modeled on the presumption that a sperm “donor” is
someone who provides sperm to a woman without the intent to
parent any resulting child, and that she accepts the sperm without
the intent to share parenting (at least not with the donor). What
courts have added to this formula is that a donor who provides
sperm with the intent to parent—and the mother accepted it on
those terms—may be entitled, constitutionally, to be treated like
other unwed fathers.
The parentage question only arises with known donors. Most
state sperm donor laws do not differentiate between known and
unknown sperm donors on their face. And courts have tended to
rule that non-paternity rules are not limited to anonymous
donors. In other words, known donors can be precluded from
establishing paternity even if there was a prior sexual relationship
between the donor and the mother.74 Moreover, sperm donor
statutes do not lend themselves to judicial discretion. They
provide bright-line rules about when the non-paternity rule
should be applied, and courts have tended to give them that effect.
That is why William Marotta, who donated free sperm to a lesbian
couple who found him on Craigslist, was deemed a legal father
even though they had entered into a written agreement providing
otherwise.75 Because the sperm donation was not done through a
licensed physician, the Kansas non-paternity law did not apply.
He is the legal father of the child and is obligated to provide
support.
The strict application of non-paternity rules invites
constitutional challenges by some men who believe they have
been misclassified as donors rather than dads. While no court has
ever found a non-paternity rule to violate equal protection
principles—the law supports at least modest distinctions between
unwed mothers and unwed fathers based on the different
biological roles in reproduction76—some courts have concluded,
74. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392, 394 (1986); Steven S. v.
Deborah D., 127 Cal. App. 4th 319, 325 (2005); In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989);
A.A.B. v. B.O.C., 112 So. 3d 761, 763–64 (Fla. Ct. App. 2013); Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So.
2d 316, 318–19 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 242–44 (Or. Ct.
App. 1989).
75. State v. W.M., No. 12D2686, Kan. Dist. Ct. (Jan. 22, 2014).
76. See, e.g., In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1039 (Kan. 2007); McIntyre, 780 P.2d at
244–45; L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 721 (Va. 2013).
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or suggested in dicta, that a non-paternity rule might run afoul of
substantive due process principles if applied to a known donor
where he and the mother had clearly reached a pre-insemination
agreement about joint parenting. To avoid constitutional
problems, some courts have found that the non-paternity rule
does not apply where the mother and donor clearly intended that
the donor would be a father. In In re R.C., for example, the
Colorado Supreme Court concluded that when
the unmarried recipient and the known donor at the time of
insemination agree that the donor will be the natural father and
act accordingly based on an express understanding that he will
be treated as the father of any child so conceived, we concur
with commentators, as well as [other] courts, that agreement
and subsequent conduct are relevant to preserving the donor’s
parental rights despite the existence of the statute.77

The case was remanded for a determination whether the
mother and donor had agreed at the time of insemination that the
donor would be the father of any resulting child. “If no such
agreement was present at the time of insemination, then [the nonpaternity rule] operates to extinguish [the donor’s] parental rights
and duties . . . .”78
In some cases, the clash between the statute and the
constitution is unavoidable. Known donors have launched due
process challenges when they have clear evidence of a mutual
agreement to share parenting rights and responsibilities but are
nonetheless barred from establishing paternity. These cases
revolve around Lehr v. Robertson79 and the notion that unwed
biological fathers cannot be deprived of parental rights unless
they have failed to grasp the opportunity for a parent-child
relationship. In In re K.M.H., for example, the Kansas Supreme
Court considered the claim of a known donor, a friend of the
mother, for parental rights.80 He claimed they had orally agreed

77. In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989).
78. Id.; see also C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas 1994)
(holding that, in order to avoid constitutional questions, the non-paternity rule does not
apply where a woman solicits a known donor and the parties agreed that the donor would
have a relationship with the child); D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 334-41 (Fla. 2013)
(holding the egg donor law of non-maternity would be unconstitutional as applied to a
woman who provided the egg for a child carried by her partner with the intent to coparent).
79. 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
80. 169 P.3d at 1029.
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that he would have a relationship with any child resulting from the
insemination, but Kansas law applies a rule of non-paternity
unless the donor and mother agreed otherwise in writing. The
donor claimed that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to
him because it recognized only written agreements regarding
parental status and not oral ones. The court read Lehr to prevent
a state from absolutely barring a biological parent from asserting
parental rights, but distinguished the Kansas statute because of
the opt-out provision. “Even a sperm donor with no relationship
to a child’s mother can forge and protect his parental rights by
insisting on a written agreement.”81 The court rejected the donor’s
argument that the opt-out clause was too narrow because only
written expressions of intent mattered, noting that a primary
purpose of the parentage act was “to prevent the creation of
parental status where it is not desired or expected.”82
Sperm donor laws that do not permit an intended father to
opt out of a rule of non-paternity may be unconstitutional. In L.F.
v. Breit, the Virginia Supreme Court considered the claim of a
known donor who had entered into a pre-insemination written
agreement (and a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity
executed by both biological parents after birth), but in a
jurisdiction with no opt-out provision in the non-paternity rule.83
The court concluded that the non-paternity rule nonetheless did
not apply where “the biological mother and sperm donor were
known to each other, lived together as a couple, jointly assumed
rights and responsibilities, and voluntarily executed a statutorily
prescribed acknowledgment of paternity.”84 The court suggested
in dicta that the statute would have been unconstitutional as
applied to the donor on due process grounds.
The existing cases on the constitutional aspects of sperm
donation have virtually all focused on the donor’s potential rights
and whether his classification as a donor runs afoul of his parental
rights. But these cases also potentially implicate the parental
rights of the mother. If her rights include the right to exclude, then
those cannot be diluted by recognition of the donor as a father
unless she, too, intended that result at the time of insemination.
Conception through sex gives both genetic parents the right to
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1041.
736 S.E.2d 711 (Va. 2013).
Id. at 720.
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become parents, but when a woman relies on artificial
insemination, and the donor is subject to a non-paternity rule, the
child comes into this world with only one legal parent—the
mother. Elevating the status of the donor can only be done
consistently with her rights, perhaps on a theory of consent as
discussed below for de facto parentage.85
C. SURROGACY
An increasingly popular type of family creation, surrogacy
involves an agreement that one woman will conceive and carry a
child for someone else to raise.86 In its traditional form, a woman
conceived a child using her own egg and sperm from the husband
of an infertile woman. In its modern form, the surrogate
contributes no genetic material; in vitro fertilization is used to
implant an embryo. The legal questions about surrogacy arise out
of governing contracts that purport to assign parentage to
someone other than the person designated by the traditional
rules. Can parentage be relinquished—and assumed—prior to the
birth of a child? Can one parent who contributes genetic material
to the conception agree to share parentage with a partner who did
not? After birth, the substitution of one set of legal parents for
another would be governed by adoption law, with rules about the
revocability of consent, screening of the adoptive parent, and so
on. But surrogacy arrangements rely on the enforceability of the
pre-conception agreement, without which the child would never
have been brought into the world, and its ability to bind every
party. Although constitutional parental rights are rarely
mentioned in the context of surrogacy, they underlie the entire
arrangement.
The well-known Baby M. case brought the emerging issue of
surrogacy into the public consciousness.87 There, a traditional
surrogate, who had been paid $10,000 to conceive and gestate a
child for another couple, refused to honor the agreement. The
85. See Jason P. v. Danielle S., 226 Cal. App. 4th 167, 176 (2014) (holding that the
non-paternity rule precludes “a sperm donor from establishing paternity based upon his
biological connection to the child”).
86. Amy Garrity, A Comparative Analysis of Surrogacy Law in the United States and
Great Britain—A Proposed Model Statute for Louisiana, 60 LA. L. REV. 809, 809 (2000).
87. For a history of this case and its role in the surrogacy debate, see Elizabeth S.
Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109
(2009); see also Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby
M., 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007).
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case unfolded dramatically, culminating in a ruling from the New
Jersey Supreme Court that the agreement was void as against
public policy.88 With the contract deemed unenforceable, the
traditional rules of parentage came into play. The child’s legal
parents were her biological mother (the surrogate) and biological
father (the sperm donor and intended father). Both the surrogate
and the biological father had made unsuccessful constitutional
claims. Mary Beth Whitehead argued that her parental rights
could not be voluntarily relinquished prior to birth, nor
involuntarily at any point without a showing of parental unfitness.
She asserted that her right of procreation included the “right to
the companionship of her child.”89 The court never reached her
constitutional claim because it ruled that the surrogacy contract
was unenforceable. The biological father asserted that his right to
have children included the right to care, custody, and control of
the child. The court rejected his claim because, if taken as far as
he asserted, it would interfere with Whitehead’s comparable right
of procreation. “[I]t would be to assert,” the court wrote, “that the
constitutional right of procreation includes within it a
constitutionally protected contractual right to destroy someone
else’s right of procreation.”90
A gestational carrier in the next big case, Johnson v. Calvert,
argued that it would infringe her constitutionally protected
parental rights to enforce the surrogacy contract and require her
to relinquish parental status to the intended parents. The
California Supreme Court rejected the argument because it
“depends on a prior determination that she is indeed the child’s
mother.”91 The question, then, was whether it was
unconstitutional for the trial court to determine that she was not
the child’s legal mother. With respect to that decision, the
gestational carrier held constitutional interests, at best, that were
“something less than those of a mother.”92 She did not have a
genetic tie necessary to rely on the unwed father cases, and she
did not have a separate liberty interest. There was no tradition of
88. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
89. Id. at 1253.
90. Id. at 1254.
91. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785–86 (Cal. 1993). California codified the
ruling in Calvert, adopting a statute that expressly makes surrogacy agreements
enforceable as long as they satisfy certain minimal conditions. See Cal. Fam. Code § 7962
(2017).
92. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 786.
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protecting the “right of a woman who gestates and delivers a baby
pursuant to an agreement with a couple who supply the zygote
from which the baby develops and who intend to raise the child as
their own.”93 Thus, she could not claim that she was directly
protected by substantive due process principles. Moreover, the
court concluded, “if we were to conclude that [the gestational
carrier] enjoys some sort of liberty interest in the companionship
of the child, then the liberty interests of [the intended parents],
the child’s natural parents, in their procreative choices and their
relationship with the child would perforce be infringed.”94 Thus,
giving effect to the parties’ agreement about parentage “does not
offend the state or federal Constitution;” enforceability is a
question of public policy rather than a matter for constitutional
debate.95
The Baby M. ruling reverberated on a national scale,
provoking a contentious public debate and a wide range of
legislative responses that are still felt today. Today, almost thirty
years later, surrogacy remains controversial for both same-sex
and different-sex families, and states remain split over its
legality.96 As gestational surrogacy has become the norm—the
carrier provides only the womb, not the egg—some states have
begun to permit surrogacy but to regulate it by statute.97 The
debate continues, but little of the attention is on constitutional
parameters. And perhaps this is appropriate, given that we permit
parents to surrender parental rights by placing a child for
adoption. If those rights could not be waived or surrendered, we
would expect every adoption decree (and facilitating law) to be
challenged on constitutional grounds. But we don’t. Courts have
largely seen fit to recognize that no one’s constitutional rights are
abridged by a state’s decision whether or not to permit
enforcement of a surrogacy contract.

93. Id.
94. Id.; see also C.M. v. M.C., 7 Cal. App. 5th 1188, 1203–05 (2017) (rejecting
constitutional claims by gestational carrier).
95. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 778.
96. Compare, e.g., In re the Paternity of F.T.R, 833 N.W.2d 634 (Wis. 2013) (holding
the surrogacy agreement entered by the parties as a valid and enforceable contract) with
R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) (holding that surrogacy agreement between the
surrogate mother and father was unenforceable); see also N.Y. DOM. REL. § 123
(McKinney 1993) (prohibiting compensated surrogacy).
97. See, e.g., 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 47/5 (2017).

GROSSMAN_DRAFT 6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

328

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/13/17 12:44 PM

[Vol. 32:307

D. LESBIAN CO-PARENTS
Litigation between lesbian co-parents over parental status—
and concomitant rights and responsibilities—represent the lion’s
share of parentage litigation today. In broad brush, lesbians began
co-parenting children before gay men did, and they remain much
more likely to do so. Much of parentage law that has developed
since the late 1980s has revolved around lesbian couples raising
children with a genetic tie to one parent, but not the other.98
Doctrinal development has been piecemeal not only because of
the expected jurisdictional variation but also because of the
dramatic change over time in parentage law and in the treatment
of gay and lesbian individuals and families. Yet, it is crucially
important given the sheer number of same-sex couples who are
raising children together. An estimated 125,000 same-sex couples
are raising nearly 220,000 children in the United States.99 How has
constitutional protection for parental rights influenced the
development of lesbian co-parent rights? Courts have reconciled
the tension between parental rights and parental status in this
context based on the notion of consent—that a biological mother
can consent to the sharing of her constitutionally protected
parental rights. Differences of judicial opinion about the forms
that consent can take or how it can be measured account for a
landscape that remains relatively chaotic despite many decades of
work.
1. Second-Parent Adoption
A central site for conflicts between state parentage law and
constitutional parental rights is in the decision whether to
recognize a lesbian co-parent as having protected ties to her
partner’s child. Although the two women may have undertaken
and carried out parenting jointly, one of the women has full-blown
parental rights and the other has no constitutionally recognized
claim to parental status. Thus, the constitutional question is when
and under what circumstances the parental rights of the biological
mother can be shared—or must be shared.

98. Nancy D. Polikoff, Brief Amicus Curiae, R-Y v. Robin Y., N.Y. Cty. Fam. Ct.
Docket No. P388491, reprinted in 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 213, 219–20 n.2
(1996) (citing documentation of early lesbian planned families).
99. GARY J. GATES, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, LGBT
PARENTING IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2013).
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Before the ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges,100 in which the
Supreme Court recognized that same-sex couples had a right to
marry, lesbian couples began to use second-parent adoption to
cement their family ties.101 This type of adoption is “modeled on
step-parent adoption, a statutory scheme that allows a biological
(or adoptive) parent’s spouse to adopt a child without terminating
that parent’s rights, thereby leaving the child with two parents.”102
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was among the
first to countenance second-parent adoption, in 1993, in Adoption
of Tammy.103 Two women jointly petitioned to adopt the child to
which one of them had given birth.104 The governing statute did
not explicitly rule out adoption by an unmarried couple, and the
court allowed it to take place given the overwhelming evidence of
a stable family unit.105 The Supreme Court of Vermont had
approved a lesbian second-parent adoption earlier that same
year.106 After 1993, but before Obergefell in 2015, several states
began to allow this type of adoption, either via statute or appellate
court ruling, or at the trial court level without express authority.107
Today, same-sex spouses should have the same access to
stepparent adoption as different-sex spouses, as well as equal
opportunity to jointly adopt a child.108
Legislative and judicial approval of second-parent adoptions
require two steps from the traditional parentage rules: (1) that a
child can have two legal parents of the same sex; and (2) that a
legal mother can allow her unmarried partner to adopt without
severing her own ties with the child. For our purposes, the second
100. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
101. On the development of second-parent adoption for same-sex couples, see
generally GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 45, at 320–29.
102. Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child:
Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN.
J.C.R. & C.L. 201, 2015 (2009); see also Erin J. Law, Taking a Critical Look at Second
Parent Adoption, 8 LAW & SEXUALITY 699, 701, 707 (1998).
103. 619 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Mass. 1993).
104. Id. at 315.
105. Id. at 317–18.
106. See Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993).
107. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 9-5-203(1), 19-5-208(5), 19-5-210(1.5), 19-5211(1.5) (2012) (recognizing second-parent adoption); see also Sharon S. v. Super. Ct., 73
P.3d 554, 568, 572 (Cal. 2003) (allowing second-parent adoption and noting that twenty
thousand such adoptions had already taken place in the state).
108. See Campaign for Southern Equality v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Servs., 175 F. Supp.
3d 691, 697 (D. Miss. 2016) (striking down last state law barring adoption by same-sex
couples).
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deviation is more important. Second-parent adoptions endorse
the idea that a legal parent can waive the exclusivity of her
parental rights—not only to a substitute parent as in a traditional
adoption, but also to a joint parent. Express consent of the
recognized parent plays a fundamental, indeed essential, role in
second-parent adoptions. Adoption is the most secure form of
parental status because adoption decrees are entitled to the most
exacting form of full faith and credit.109 But can parentage also be
shared through less formal mechanisms? This, too, requires some
form of consent by the recognized parent.
2. Shared Parental Rights by Agreement
In just the past decade, several state supreme courts have
held that co-parents can gain legal parent or quasi-parent status
based solely on a co-parenting agreement with an unmarried
partner. Boseman v. Jarrell grew out of the decision by Melissa
and Julia, two women in a committed relationship, to have a
child.110 The couple decided that Melissa would bear the child, but
both women were involved in every stage of the process. A trial
court approved their petition for a second-parent adoption in
2005, even though the North Carolina Code did not expressly
provide for one.111 The decree explicitly stated that it would create
a full parent-child relationship between Julia and the child, while
“not sever[ing] the relationship of parent and child between the
individual adopted and that individual’s biological mother.”112
The following year, the two women terminated their
relationship, but Julia continued to support Melissa and the child.
Melissa soon reduced Julia’s contact with the child, and Julia filed
a complaint seeking custody. Melissa argued that the adoption
decree was invalid because the judge exceeded his legal
authority.113 Without the adoption, she argued, Julia was not a
“parent” and could not seek custody. On appeal, the North
Carolina Supreme Court agreed that the adoption was void ab

109. See V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1021–22 (2016) (per curiam) (reversing a ruling
from the Alabama Supreme Court refusing effect to a second-parent adoption decree from
Georgia).
110. 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010).
111. Id. at 497.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 498.
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initio.114 This holding put Julia on tenuous footing as a non-parent,
but the court felt she was not a typical third party. A parent can
lose out, the court reasoned, on the absolute nature of parental
rights, not only by demonstrating unfitness but also through a
“voluntary grant of nonparent custody.”115 Melissa “intentionally
and voluntarily created a family unit in which [Julia] was intended
to act—and acted—as a parent,” with “no expectation that this
family unit was only temporary.”116 She thus “acted inconsistently
with her paramount parental status,” and was entitled to no
special preference in a custody dispute with Julia.117 Julia, in
effect, was entitled to joint custody without first obtaining the
status of legal parent.
In In re Mullen, the Ohio Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion.118 Like Melissa and Julia, Kelly and Michele had
jointly participated in the planning, conception (including the
expense of IVF), delivery, and raising of a child to which Kelly
gave birth. Kelly and the sperm donor settled on an agreement
providing that while his name would be listed on the birth
certificate, he would not retain any parental rights or be obligated
to support the child. Kelly executed a will and a health-care proxy
in which she gave Michele the authority to act as Kelly’s agent
with respect to the child. In these documents, Kelly stated that she
was the legal parent, but that Michele was her “child’s co-parent
in every way.”119 When the relationship ended, Michele filed a
complaint for shared custody, in which she alleged that Kelly had
“created a contract through her conduct with [her] to
permanently share legal custody of the child.”120 The Ohio
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that denied
Michele any rights as a parent or co-parent, but it made clear that
a lesbian co-parent could acquire parenting rights by virtue of an
enforceable shared-parenting agreement. The court confirmed
that a “parent may voluntarily share with a nonparent the care,

114. Id. at 496.
115. Id. at 503.
116. Id. at 504.
117. Id. at 505; see also Eldredge v. Taylor, 339 P.3d 888, 894 (Okla. 2014) (upholding
lesbian co-parenting agreement over constitutional objection of biological mother because
she is presumed to have been acting in their best interests when she intended to raise them
with a partner and signed agreements consenting to share her parental authority).
118. 953 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 2011).
119. Id. at 304.
120. Id.
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custody, and control of his or her child through a valid sharedcustody agreement,” the essence of which “is the purposeful
relinquishment of some portion of the parent’s right to exclusive
custody of the child.”121 Such an agreement “recognizes the
general principle that a parent can grant custody rights to a
nonparent and will be bound by the agreement.”122 A valid
shared-parenting agreement is enforceable as long as the coparent is a “proper person to assume the care, training, and
education of the child,” and the agreement serves the child’s best
interests.123 Michele simply did not have sufficient proof of an
agreement. Although this approach disregards de facto parenting
in many cases, the court felt that “the best way to safeguard both
a parent’s and a nonparent’s rights with respect to children is to
agree in writing as to how custody is to be shared, the manner in
which it is shared, and the degree to which it may be revocable or
permanent.”124
Finally, in Frazier v. Goudschaal,125 the Kansas Supreme
Court also ruled that enforceable parental rights could be created
by contract. The two women in that case had entered into written
co-parenting agreements prior to the birth of each of two children,
which provided that the non-biological parent would be a “de
facto parent” and that her “relationship with the children should
be protected and promoted;” that the parties intended to “jointly
and equally share parental responsibility;” that expenses of
childrearing should be borne proportionately relative to income;
and that in the event of a separation “the person who has actual
physical custody w[ould] take all steps necessary to maximize the
other’s visitation” with the children.126 Over the objection of the
biological mother, the court read the Kansas Parentage Act to
permit enforcement of shared parental rights.127
Together, these cases set a strong precedent for the sharing
of parental rights despite the traditional rules of parentage law.
De facto parentage, which is taken up in the following section,
accomplishes a similar result through different means.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 305–06.
Id. at 306.
Id.
Id. at 308.
295 P.3d 542 (Kan. 2013).
Id. at 546.
Id. at 558.
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3. De Facto Parentage
The third doctrine for lesbian co-parents that raises
constitutional issues is de facto parentage. De facto parentage
enables an adult without any formal legal ties to a child to be
granted legal parent, or at least parent-like, status based on
functional parentage.128 It presents one of the more complicated
clashes between parental rights and parental status because it
relies on conduct rather than formal expressions of consent by the
biological mother. But it also introduces the possibility that
lesbian co-parents have an inchoate right to be recognized, akin
though not equivalent to the rights vested in unwed biological
fathers.
The first appellate case to recognize a lesbian co-parent as a
“de facto parent” was In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.129 In this 1995
case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on this concept to allow
a lesbian co-parent, who was not related to the child by blood or
adoption, to seek visitation over the objection of the child’s
biological mother. In what today feels like a familiar story,
Elsbeth and Sandra were intimate partners and planned together
to start a family. The women participated equally in every aspect
of planning for and parenting a child during the first four years of
the child’s life. But when the two women broke off their
relationship, Elsbeth cut off contact between Sandra and the
child. In a suit for custody and visitation, Sandra sought to be
recognized as functional parent. Her claim did not fit nicely into
the state family law code, yet, the state’s highest court concluded
that she had standing to seek visitation with the child.130 Taken
together, the statutes governing custody and visitation showed the
“continuing legislative concern with identifying the triggering
events that warrant state interference in an otherwise protected
parent-child relationship.”131 The court recognized an equitable
right for Sandra to seek visitation based on her functional parent-

128. States differ as to the scope of rights held by a de facto parent. Compare V.C. v.
M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2000) (holding that the psychological parent “stands in
parity with the legal parent,” and “[c]ustody and visitation issues between them are to be
determined on a best interests standard”) with In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419,
423–24 (Wis. 1995) (noting that custody, as opposed to mere visitation, cannot be granted
to a de facto parent without evidence that the legal parent is unfit).
129. 533 N.W.2d at 420–21.
130. Id. at 435.
131. Id. at 427.
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child relationship.132 Elsbeth argued that any recognition of the
relationship between Sandra and the child over Elsbeth’s
objection would violate her constitutional parental rights.133 But
the court observed that those rights are not absolute; state public
policy “directs the court to respect and protect parental autonomy
and at the same time to serve the best interest of the child.”134
In this type of case, the balance was struck by allowing a court
to hear a petition for visitation when “it determines that the
petitioner has a parent-like relationship with the child and that a
significant triggering event justifies state intervention in the
child’s relationship with a biological or adoptive parent.”135 The
parent-like relationship is established through four elements: (1)
consent by the biological parent to foster the formation of the
parent-child relationship; (2) living in the same household with
the child; (3) assuming the obligations of parenthood, including
support and childrearing; and (4) sufficient duration to establish
“with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in
nature.”136 The triggering event, in turn, must be established with
proof that the biological parent interfered with the petitioner’s
parent-like relationship and that the petitioner sought courtordered visitation “within a reasonable time.”137 Once
established, the de facto parent must also show that visitation is in
the child’s best interests.138
This test became the gold standard for de facto
parentage.139 Recognition of de facto parentage, however, is not
universal. Several states have rejected it outright.140 Their chief

132. Id. at 425–36.
133. Id. at 434.
134. Id. at 435.
135. Id. at 421.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 436.
138. See id. at 421.
139. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 559–60 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Rubano v.
DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000). Several other states adopted the doctrine of de
facto parentage without strictly adhering to the Wisconsin test. See, e.g., Kulstad v.
Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595 (Mont. 2009); Soohoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 2007);
T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999).
140. See, e.g., Guardianship of Z.C.W. and K.G.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999); Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Matter of
Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 320–21 (Ill. App. 1999); Matter of Visitation with
C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. 1999); B.F. v. T.D., 194 S.W.3d 310, 312 (Ky. 2006); In re
Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 809–10
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concern is intruding on the rights of the biological mother, in
violation of her constitutionally protected parental rights.141 For
example, a court of appeals in Louisiana reasoned de facto
parentage should be rejected because a mother’s “paramount
right of a parent in the care, custody, and control of his or [sic]
child” can be abrogated only in “rare circumstances.”142 The Utah
Supreme Court rejected the doctrine simply because it “would
abrogate a portion of the [biological mother’s] parental rights.”143
Are these courts right that de facto parentage presents an
irreconcilable conflict with the biological mother’s constitutional
parental rights? One constitutional objection to the doctrine is
that lesbian co-parents are third parties unless and until the
parent-child relationship is cemented through adoption or some
other formal mechanism. And, in a dispute over custody or
visitation, the parent and non-parent are not on equal footing;
their dispute cannot constitutionally be resolved based solely on
the best interests of the child.
In Stadter v. Siperko,144 for example, a Virginia court ruled
that a lesbian co-parent was, for Troxel purposes, like any other
third party seeking to override the wishes of a fit parent. Despite
equal participation in all aspects of planning for and raising the
child, the co-parent was not entitled to the more lenient “parentstandard” when in a dispute with the biological mother. Rather,
she could gain visitation over the mother’s objection only if the
mother had “voluntarily relinquished” custody to the non-parent
or if clear and convincing evidence established that a “denial of
visitation would be harmful or detrimental to the welfare of the
child.”145 The Stadter court refused to recognize de facto
parentage as a means of rebutting the Troxel presumption that the
fit parent’s decision to deny visitation was the right one.146
Have courts been hasty in assuming that recognition of the
doctrine of de facto parentage is inconsistent with the biological
(Utah 2007); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997); Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d
494, 499–501 (Va. Ct. App. 2008).
141. See, e.g., Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 918–19; Jones, 154 P.3d at 819.
142. Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
143. Jones, 154 P.3d at 819.
144. 661 S.E.2d 494 (Va. Ct. App. 2008).
145. Id. at 498.
146. Id. at 498–99; see also Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169, 1176 (Me. 2014) (recognizing
a de facto parent only “when the failure or refusal to so determine will result in harm to
the child” because the “intrusion into a parent’s fundamental rights is substantial”).
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mother’s constitutional parental rights? As we have seen in the
context of adoption and co-parenting agreements, a legal parent
can consent to share parental rights with a co-parent. So maybe
the question should only be whether that consent can be
adequately measured outside of a formal adoption process or a
written co-parenting agreement. As the court noted in In re
H.S.H.-K, “[t]hrough consent, a biological or adoptive parent
exercises his or her constitutional right of parental autonomy to
allow another adult to develop a parent-like relationship with the
child.”147 Adopting the same test in a lesbian co-parent case, the
New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that the first prong “is
critical because it makes the biological or adoptive parent a
participant in the creation of the psychological parent’s
relationship with the child;” by fostering the relationship, “the
legal parent ceded over to the third party a measure of parental
authority and autonomy and granted to that third party rights and
duties vis-à-vis the child that the third party’s status would not
otherwise warrant.”148 The parent can protect “a zone of
autonomous privacy,” but, once ceded, she loses the right to
terminate the parent-child relationship unilaterally.149
Perhaps the best way to think about de facto parentage is not
as a dispute in which a parent has consented to share rights with a
non-parent, but as a dispute in which both women are rightsholding parents based on their intent to parent and actual
parenting contributions. In a dispute between two fit parents,
disputes can be resolved by a simple best-interests analysis—thus
bypassing the constitutional problem altogether. When the
Washington Supreme Court adopted de facto parentage in In re
Parentage of L.B., it concluded that “Troxel does not establish
that recognition of a de facto parentage right infringes on the
liberty interests of a biological or adoptive parent.”150 If the coparent meets the criteria to be a de facto parent, then the
147. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419, 436 n.40 (Wis. 1995).
148. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000).
149. Id.; see also Gordius v. Kelley, 139 A.3d 928, 930 (Me. 2016) (noting that a claim
of de facto parentage is one of the situations “that will interfere with the normal parentchild relationship” in a way that is “constitutionally permitted”); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759
A.2d 959, 976 (R.I. 2000) (by allowing her partner to “assume an equal role as one of the
child’s two parents,” a biological mother “rendered her own parental rights with respect
to this boy less exclusive and less exclusory than they otherwise would have been had she
not by word and deed allowed [her partner] to establish a parental bond with the child and
then agreed to allow reasonable visitation”).
150. 122 P.3d 161, 178 (Wash. 2005).
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biological mother and the co-parent “would both have a
‘fundamental liberty interest[]’ in the ‘care, custody, and control’
of [the child].”151 Troxel, the Washington court wrote, “did not
address the issue of state law determinations of ‘parents’ and
‘families’” and does not “place any constitutional limitations on
the ability of states to legislatively, or through their common law,
define a parent or family.”152 Parentage, in other words, is a
threshold determination that precedes the exercise of parental
rights. The Delaware Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion
in Smith v. Guest, explaining that a de facto parent’s claim is not
like that of a “third party having no claim to a parent-child
relationship.”153 Rather, the plaintiff in that case is a “de facto
parent who . . . would also be a legal ‘parent’” and would thus have
a “co-equal ‘fundamental parental interest’” in raising the child.154
Allowing her “to pursue that interest through a legally-recognized
channel cannot unconstitutionally infringe Smith’s due process
rights.”155
In two recent, noteworthy opinions, state supreme courts
reversed themselves by adopting the de facto parentage doctrine
after having explicitly rejected it. In both cases, the shift reflects a
difference in the view of the co-parent—as an individual with
inchoate parental rights rather than as a third party. In Maryland,
the state’s highest court had held in Janice M. v. Margaret K. that
the doctrine was not a viable means for a lesbian co-parent to
petition for custody or visitation.156 The court characterized the
case as a dispute between a fit parent and a third party and found
the plurality opinion in Troxel v. Granville instructive: the parent
is asserting a constitutional right—the right to exclude—and the
“third party” is not.157 In such a dispute, the non-parent can only
prevail by proving the unfitness of the parent or the existence of
151. Id.
152. Id. Kennedy suggested this line of reasoning in his dissent in Troxel. See Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 100–01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“a fit parent’s right vis-à-vis a
complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-à-vis another parent or a de facto parent may
be another”) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 98 (“Cases are sure to arise—perhaps a
substantial number of cases—in which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a
significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a child which is not necessarily
subject to absolute parental veto.”).
153. 16 A.3d 920, 931 (Del. 2011).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 948 A.2d 73, 87 (Md. 2008).
157. Id. at 81.
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“exceptional circumstances.” It thus refused to “recognize de
facto parent status.”158 In 2016, however, the Maryland court
reversed itself, ruling in Conover v. Conover that de facto
parentage is a viable basis for standing to petition for custody or
visitation.159 The key to the shift was in re-characterizing the
would-be de facto parent as something other than a “pure third
party.” People in a “parental role” stand above the world of true
third parties and are entitled to have the parent-like relationship
considered in the determination of legal status.160 Thus, the
de facto parent doctrine does not contravene the principle that
legal parents have a fundamental right to direct and govern the
care, custody, and control of their children because a legal
parent does not have a right to voluntarily cultivate their child’s
parental-type relationship with a third party and then seek to
extinguish it.161

The evolution in New York was similar to Maryland, only
there the state’s highest court had twice rejected the doctrine of
de facto parentage, seventeen years apart. In Alison D. v. Virginia
M., one of the first cases in which lesbian co-parent rights were
litigated, the court held that a mother’s lesbian partner was not a
“parent” within the meaning of the custody and visitation
statute.162 When the court agreed to review a case presenting the
same issue in 2010, it was widely expected that it would reverse
itself—given the dramatic change in the law and social norms
surrounding parenting by same-sex couples. But it did not. In
Debra H. v. Janice R., the New York Court of Appeals again
rejected the doctrine of de facto parentage in order to promote
“certainty in the wake of domestic breakups” and avoid
“disruptive battles over parentage.”163 Just six years later, though,
the same court finally reversed itself, holding in Brooke S.B. v.
158. Id. at 87.
159. 146 A.3d 433 (Md. 2016).
160. Id. at 443.
161. Id. at 447; see also A.A. v. B.B., 384 P.3d 878, 885–92 (Haw. 2016) (adoptive
parent who chose to share physical custody and parenting responsibilities with a same-sex
co-parent “does not have a protected privacy interest in excluding [the co-parent] from
[the] [c]hild’s life” under the state or federal constitution); R.M. v. T.A., 233 Cal. App. 4th
760, 776 (2015) (when “a two parent relationship has in fact been developed with the
child,” “the interests of the child in maintaining the second parental relationship can
properly take precedence over one parent’s claimed desire to raise the child alone.”);
Nancy D. Polikoff, From Third Parties to Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples and Their
Children, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2014).
162. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
163. 930 N.E.2d 184, 191–92 (N.Y. 2010).
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Elizabeth A.C.C. that “where a petitioner proves by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she has agreed with the biological
parent of the child to conceive and raise the child as co-parents,
the petitioner has presented sufficient evidence to achieve
standing to seek custody and visitation of the child.”164 The court
expressly reserved the question whether a co-parent who came
onto the scene after conception of the child could be treated as a
de facto parent, opting for a narrow holding that would “protect
the substantial and fundamental right of biological or adoptive
parents to control the upbringing of their children.”165 Like the
Maryland court, the New York court created a path to de facto
parentage by recharacterizing the co-parent’s claim. “[H]ere,” the
court wrote, “we do not consider whether to allow a third party to
contest or infringe on those rights; rather, the issue is who
qualifies as a ‘parent’ with coequal rights.”166
The approaches taken by the Maryland and New York courts
in recent cases are perhaps illustrative of a trend, but they do not
yet represent a universal position. Consent has emerged as an
increasingly important concept in the sharing of parental rights,
but the question remains open whether a non-biological parent
might have rights akin to those of, say, an unwed father, but
rooted in intent and function rather than reliance.167
CONCLUSION
Although we are many decades removed from Stanley v.
Illinois and the Supreme Court’s observation that parentage rules
must themselves be constitutional, parentage law is still in a state
of relative chaos. There remains significant jurisdictional
variation in almost every rule of parentage, and it is hard for
individuals to predict whether the children they create and the
relationships they nurture will be protected by law. This
uncertainty is aggravated by the complicated role that
constitutional parental rights can play in parentage
determinations—sometimes requiring the recognition of a parent,
164. 61 N.E.3d 488, 501 (N.Y. 2016).
165. Id. at 499.
166. Id.
167. But see, e.g., Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 60 (Fla. 2015) (rejecting the argument
that an intentional co-parent may have some constitutional interest in being a parent akin
to the “inchoate right to be a parent” possessed by an adult with a biological or legal
connection to a child).
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sometimes precluding it, and other times invisibly or quietly
undergirding the decision. But vagueness about when, where, and
how constitutional parental rights are relevant to parentage is
unacceptable given what is at stake for parents and children. As a
starting point, this Article steps through the case law and
intersecting statutory rules of parentage to map out the current
landscape—a tedious process, to be sure, but a necessary one.
What this analysis reveals is that while courts are generally
cognizant of constitutional parental rights and their potential
relevance to parentage determinations, they do not always
grapple with those rights in ways that reflect a full grasp of their
importance or a consensus on the best way to resolve the points
of tension. Lawmakers and courts need to more explicitly account
for parental rights when determining parental status, and scholars
need to lay the groundwork for resolving the tensions between the
two.

